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1 Introduction
Climate change is the result of the accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmo-
sphere. Until now, the international community has relied on mitigation strategies to deal
with the warming caused by climate change. It is well understood, however, that mitigation
suffers from under-provision due to free-riding. In addition, there is also a great deal of
uncertainty associated with the response of the climate system to changes in greenhouse gas
concentrations. As a result, scientists are exploring new technologies designed to quickly
lower temperatures without lowering GHG concentrations.1 These technologies fall under
the category of geoengineering.
In this paper, I examine the economic issues introduced when geoengineering is made
available in a world where strategic interaction leads to under-provision of mitigation due to
free-riding. Specifically, I ask two questions: 1) does the presence of geoengineering increase
the free-riding effect on mitigation? and 2) could the costs associated with this increase in
free-riding outweigh the benefit gained from introducing geoengineering?
To answer these questions I use a conventional two-country partial equilibrium model.
The model has three key features. First, the two countries interact in a two-stage strategic
environment where each country minimizes its own costs of managing climate change. Each
country chooses mitigation levels in the first stage and geoengineering levels in the second
stage. Second, the effects of both mitigation and geoengineering are global. Third, the costs
arising from the potential side-effects of geoengineering and climate change may differ across
countries.
The costs of climate change are the sum of the costs of mitigation and geoengineering ac-
tivities plus the economic damages. The costs of mitigation and geoengineering are quadratic
1A quick reduction in temperatures may be needed in the case of rapid or catastrophic climate change.
For more on this topic see for example Taylor (2009)
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functions of their arguments, economic damages are the sum of the damages arising from
temperature changes and those arising from the side-effects of geoengineering. The dam-
ages from temperature are a quadratic function of the change in global surface temperature;
which, in turn, is proportional to radiative forcing. Radiative forcing describes how human
activity alters the balance between incoming shortwave radiation (energy coming from the
sun) and outgoing long wave radiation (energy leaving the earth’s atmosphere in the form
of heat). The damages arising from the side-effects of geoengineering are assumed to be a
quadratic function of the total level of geoengineering implemented by the two countries.
Units of mitigation and geoengineering are chosen so that their radiative forcing potentials
are proportional to the levels chosen.
Using this framework, I decompose each country’s best response to a change in the other
country’s level of mitigation into a technical substitution effect and a strategic effect. Con-
sidering this decomposition I find two important results: First, when the two countries are
similar regarding the damages from climate change and from geoengineering, I find that the
technical substitution effect dominates the strategic effect. As a result, when geoengineering
is introduced there is a reduction in the levels of mitigation in both countries; however, the
total cost of climate change is also lower.
Second, when countries differ in their underlying characteristics, they also differ greatly
in their chosen solution to the climate change problem. In this case the levels of mitigation
can increase, rather than decrease, due to the introduction of geoengineering. In particular,
the possibility of having higher levels of mitigation arises if the relative losers from climate
change and geoengineering are not the same. In this case the strategic effect dominates the
technical substitution effect, mitigation rises, temperature decreases, but the total cost of
climate change is higher.
In this paper I draw on a variety of tools from economics to answer a question most
often considered in physics and other natural sciences. The cost minimizing set up with
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increasing and convex costs and damages is standard for the analysis of climate change
policies (Nordhaus 2008, and Goulder and Mathai, 2000). The sequential nature of the
model resembles the problems of capacity building and competition on output (Brander and
Spencer, 1983 and Dixit, 1986), and these types of models are commonly used to study
non-cooperative behavior in the context of international environmental problems (Barrett,
1994 and Endres, 1997).
To physicists and natural scientists geoengineering is an option to be used only if society
fails to reach an agreement to reduce emissions (Crutzen, 2006 and MacCracken, 2006).
Alternatively, geoengineering has been proposed as part of a portfolio of technologies to deal
with catastrophic climate change (Barrett, 2007; Schelling, 2007 and Summers, 2007). For
both of these reasons, scientists agree that research on geoengineering is important because
of the advantages this option offers (Keith et al 2010; Blackstock et al, 2009; Shepherd et
al, 2009), but also agree that its implementation should be highly regulated (Barret, 2008;
Victor, 2008 and Victor et. al. 2009).
While there is surely good reason for caution, it appears that geoengineering can achieve
any given temperature target at a very low financial cost (Keith and Dowlatabadi, 1992;
Keith, 2000, 2001; Wigley, 2006 and Rasch et. al. 2008). Unfortunately, this technical
possibility may delay or eliminate mitigation by altering the strategic interaction among
countries. For example, Scott Barrett finds the introduction of geoengineering lowers the
provision of mitigation (Barrett, 2008). In addition, given the low costs of geoengineering,
unilateral implementation is a real possibility. This introduces governance problems in excess
of those existing from mitigation and creates the possibility of conflict (Schelling, 1996; Victor
et al 2010).
With this paper, I clarify some of the economic issues that arise with the introduction
of geoengineering. By decomposing the best response function into a technical substitu-
tion effect and a strategic effect, I show the impact that geoengineering has on mitigation
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choices is not so simple. I show how the impact of introducing geoengineering depends quite
delicately on the degree of similarity between countries. In a world with similar countries,
geoengineering is a Pareto improvement over a policy of only mitigation since the total cost
of climate change fall. In a world where countries differ, the presence of geoengineering can
lead to inefficiently high levels of mitigation and higher costs.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 I show how mitigation and geo-
engineering interact to determine temperature. In section 3 I present the main assumptions
regarding the costs of mitigation and geoengineering, the damage function and the objec-
tive functions in the two stages of the game. In section 4 I define the equilibrium concept
and analyze the equilibrium levels of mitigation and geoengineering. Finally, in section 5, I
summarize the main implications.
2 Mitigation, Geoengineering and Radiative Forcing
Climate change policy focuses on the relation between GHG concentrations and temperature
changes. Due to the direct link between these two variables, policy has been designed to
reduce the level of GHG concentration in order to keep surface temperature close to its
current levels.
Recently, scientists have proposed ways to alter the climate and artificially achieve a given
temperature level, independent of the concentration of GHG. These technologies are known
as geoengineering and are meant to increase the reflectiveness of the earth’s atmosphere by
injecting reflective particles into the stratosphere; thus reducing the amount of radiation
that reaches the surface of the earth.2
2Here I am considering Solar Radiation Management (SRM)technologies. There are many other possible
technologies that can achieve the same outcome (e.g. increasing the reflectivity of the clouds); however, this
technology seems to be the most appropriate from a physical and cost effective point of view (MacCracken,
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Radiative forcing describes how the balance between incoming short wave radiation and
outgoing long wave radiation is affected by human activity (IPCC, 2007).Mitigation reduces
the concentration of GHG which, in turn, increases outgoing long wave (or terrestrial) ra-
diation, which is the radiation leaving the atmosphere in the form of heat. Geoengineering
technologies are meant to reduce incoming short wave (or solar) radiation, which is the
radiation reaching the earth from the sun (Lenton and Vaughan, 2009). Thus, radiative
forcing is the outcome of the balance between two types of particles in the atmosphere:
greenhouse gases and reflective particles (Schelling, 1996). Defining the effects of mitigation
and geoengineering in terms of radiative forcing (R) is useful because the change in surface
temperature (∆T ) is approximately proportional to radiative forcing (IPCC, 2007):
∆T = λR.
where λ is a constant known as the climate sensitivity to a doubling of CO2. Formally,
surface temperature intervention is given by
T (M,G) = T0 −M −G. (1)
where M and G represent mitigation and geoengineering in terms of temperature changes.
T0 is exogenous in the model and it captures the temperature change equivalent to a business
as usual scenario of greenhouse gas emissions. Solomon et.al.(2010) find that temperature
responds linearly to cumulative emissions and that the specific time path of emissions is
irrelevant to determine future temperature. Hence, in this paper I define mitigation as any
activity that results in a reduction in cumulative emissions. That is, I am abstracting from
the exact time path of greenhouse emissions, and I concentrate on the effect that those
2006) and SRM response mode differs most fundamentally from mitigation..
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cumulative emissions have on temperature.
3 The Model
Consider a two-country partial equilibrium model. The two countries are indexed by i ∈
{1, 2}. The objective of each country is to minimize its own costs of managing climate
change. The costs of climate change are the sum of the costs of mitigation, the cost of
geoengineering and the economic damages. The costs of mitigation and geoengineering are











i , for all i ∈ {1, 2} (2)
where αi and γi are positive constants representing the slopes of the marginal cost of miti-
gation and the marginal cost of geoengineering for country i.
There are two sources of economic damages: temperature damages and geoengineering
damages. Temperature damages are those caused by the change in temperature as defined
in equation (1), e.g. the sea level rising. Geoengineering damages are caused by the possible
side effects from the implementation of geoengineering; e.g. ozone decay and changes in
precipitation patterns.3 The extent of the impacts from climate change and geoengineering









2 , for all i ∈ {1, 2} (3)
3The geoengineering technology I describe in this paper addresses only temperature related damages,
while leaving other damages untreated (i.e. ocean acidification). For simplicity I do not consider damages
from climate change different to those caused directly by global warming. For a complete treatment of
the different damages in a non-strategic environment please refer to Moreno-Cruz and Smulders (2009)
“Revisiting the Economics of Climate Change: The Role of Geoengineering.” Mimeo University of Calgary
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where M = m1+m2 and G = g1+g2 represent the total level of mitigation and the total level
of geoengineering, δi is a positive constant representing the slope of the marginal damages
from climate change and ρi is a positive constant representing the slope of the marginal
damages from geoengineering.
I model strategic climate intervention in the presence of geoengineering as a two-stage
sequential game. In the first stage countries choose mitigation levels, this mitigation levels
are made known to all countries, then geoengineering levels are determined in the second
stage. This timing of events allows for mitigation to be used strategically; by reducing the
level of “sunk” mitigation investment, countries may gain an advantage in the geoengineering
game. Because mitigation is sunk before geoengineering is implemented, a reduction in the
level of mitigation introduces a credible threat to use geoengineering.
In the geoengineering stage, each country minimizes the costs of managing climate change
while taking abatement levels as given. The solution to the problem is given by,
g∗i (M) = argmin
gi
{Bi(gi) +Di(T (M,G), G)} , for all i ∈ {1, 2} (4)
where gi are positive variables representing geoengineering choices. In the abatement stage,





i (M)) +Di(T (M,G(M)
∗), G(M)∗) , for all i ∈ {1, 2} (5)
where mi are positive variables representing mitigation choices, g
∗
i (M) is the solution to
(4), and G∗(M) = g∗1(M) + g
∗
2(M). The solution to (5) determine the subgame perfect




In the second stage, country 1 chooses the level of geoengineering that minimizes its own
costs, while holding the decisions of country 2 constant.4 Replacing equations (2) and (3)
into (4), the first order condition with respect to geoengineering is:
γ1g1 ≥ δ1[T0 −M − (g1 + g2)]− ρ1(g1 + g2) (6)
which holds with equality when g1 is greater than zero. If the geoengineering game is
cooperative the expression (6) always holds with equality. This game, however, is non-
cooperative. This implies that the level of geoengineering in country 2 can be so high
as to make the expression in (6) become strictly positive. Thus, for very high levels of
geoengineering in country 2, country 1 sets its level of geoengineering to zero.
I first assume that both countries implement positive levels of geoengineering. Hence,
expression (6) and its counterpart for country 2 hold with equality. In this case the best
response function for country 1 follows directly from (6), and it is given by:
g1(g2;M) = −φ1g2 + ψ1[T0 −M ] (7)
where φ1 = (δ1 + ρ1)/(γ1 + δ1 + ρ1) is the slope of the best response function and ψ1 =
δ1/(γ1 +δ1 +ρ1) measures the strength of the response of country 1 to a change in mitigation
levels. Because geoengineering is a global public good, it is under-provided in equilibrium
due to free-riding. To see this, notice that the best response functions in the second stage are
downward sloping — if g2 is reduced, the marginal productivity of geoengineering in country
4I solve the equilibrium for country 1. A similar procedure is used to calculate the results for country 2.
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1 increases and g1 will be raised, and viceversa. Also notice that if the mitigation levels are
slightly larger, while holding country 2 response fixed, the geoengineering level decreases in
country 1.
The equilibrium levels of geoengineering in both countries can be written as a function




[T0 −M ] (8)
The condition ψ1 − φ1ψ2 > 0 (and the equivalent for country 2) has to hold in an
equilibrium where both countries implement positive levels of geoengineering. That is, the
direct effects of a change in mitigation in country 1, ψ1, have to be larger than the indirect
effects in country 2, φ1ψ2. The shaded area in Figure 1 shows the combination of parameters
for which geoengineering levels are strictly positive in both countries. This area shows that
for the equilibrium exhibit positive levels of geoengineering in both countries, damages from
climate change and damages from geoengineering must be similar across countries. In the
limiting case where damages in the two countries are identical, the geoengineering stage
equilibrium is always interior.
The clear area in Figure 1 shows the possibility of only one country implementing geoengi-
neering. The figure shows that this possibility arises when the damages from geoengineering
are highly asymmetric across countries. When this is the case, expression (6) is strictly
positive. If a reduction in the mitigation level induces a change in the geoengineering level
of country 1 that is larger than the direct effect in country 2, it is in country 2 best interest
to set its own level of geoengineering to zero. In this case, it follows from (7) that the value
of geoengineering for country 1 is g∗1(M) = ψ1[T0 − A] and g∗2 = 0. On the other hand, if
ψ1 − φ1ψ2 < 0, then g1(M) = 0 and g∗2(M) = ψ2[T0 − A].
Finally, it follows from (8) that the level of geoengineering decreases when the damages
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Geoengineering damages, country 1
Figure 1: Parameter space—Interior Equilibrium and Corner Solutions. The horizontal axes
shows the marginal damages from geoengineering in country 1 and the vertical axes shows the
marginal damages from geoengineering in country 2. The shaded area shows the combination
of parameters for which geoengineering is positive in both countries. The clear area shows
the cases in which only one the countries implements geoengineering.
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from geoengineering increase: the level of geoengineering is higher towards the origin and
decreases in the direction of the northeast in Figure 1. It can be seen, also in Figure 1, that
there is always some level of geoengineering implemented by one or both countries. The
total level of geoengineering as a function of mitigation is given by:
G(M) = g1(M) + g2(M) =

[1− µ][T0 −M ] if ψ2 > ψ1φ2 and ψ1 > ψ2φ1
ψ1[T0 −M ] if ψ2 < ψ1φ2 and ψ1 > ψ2φ1




γ1γ2 + ρ1γ2 + ρ2γ1
γ1γ2 + γ1[δ2 + ρ2] + γ2[δ1 + ρ1]
< 1 (10)
It can be noted, given µ < 1, that geoengineering implementation in the second stage only
partially compensates for the unmitigated changes in temperature. That is, in equilibrium
there will be always some level of positive damages. The extent of damages depends on
whether one or two countries implement geoengineering and on the mitigation decisions
made in the first stage of the game.
Equation (9) shows that geoengineering levels are a function of the total level of miti-
gation, and not of country specific levels of mitigation. The next proposition captures this
interaction.
Proposition 1: A reduction in mitigation by one or both countries raises the total level
of geoengineering and temperature rises.
Proof: Follows directly from taking derivatives of (8) with respect to M and the as-
sumptions of perfect substitution in the temperature function and separability of costs and
damages.
A decrease in the level of mitigation in the first stage, by increasing the productivity of
geoengineering in the second stage, shifts country 1’s reaction function outward. Country 1
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level of geoengineering has increase marginally, but geoengineering in country 2 has decreased
slightly. However, the decrease in mitigation levels also increases the level of geoengineering
in country 2. Hence, a reduction in the first stage level of mitigation causes an increase in
the total level of geoengineering in equilibrium. Moreover, geoengineering levels are strategic
substitutes, then the reduction in mitigation is not matched perfectly by the total increase
in geoengineering levels, resulting in higher temperatures.
4.2 Mitigation Stage
In the first stage, countries choose the level of mitigation that solves (5). When countries
make their mitigation decisions they take into consideration the effects of their choice on the
level of geoengineering that will be chosen in the second stage. That is, countries are aware
of the relation between mitigation and geoengineering established in equation (9).
Using the envelope theorem and equation (6), the first order condition for the choice of
mitigation in country 1 is given by




The exact form of equation (11) depends on the degree of similarity of the two countries.
In particular, the total level of geoengineering is different if countries are similar or if countries
are asymmetric. The analysis below proceeds as follows: First, I analyze the case when
both countries implement geoengineering, that is G∗(M) = [1 − µ][T0 − M ]. Second, I
analyze the case when country 1 implements geoengineering and country 2 does not; that is
G∗(M) = g∗1(M) = ψ1[T0 −M ].
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4.2.1 Similar countries
When countries are similar and G∗(M) = [1− µ][T0 −M ], equation (11) is reduced to:
α1m1 = µδ1[T0 −M ]− [µδ1 − [1− µ]ρ1]
∂g2(M)
∂M
[T0 −M ] (12)
Equation (12) captures the standard result in environmental economics stating the marginal
cost of mitigation is equal to its marginal benefits. In the presence of geoengineering, how-
ever, the marginal benefits of mitigation change. I identify two effects altering the marginal
benefits of mitigation: the technical substitution effect given by µ, and the strategic effect
given by [µδ1 − [1 − µ]ρ1]∂g
2(M)
∂M
. The technical substitution effect in equation (12) shows
the marginal damages from climate change in country 1 are reduced from δ1 to µδ1, where
µ < 1 by equation (10). The strategic effect appears in equation (12) due to the sequential
choice of the problem: mitigation decisions have a direct, one way, impact on the choice of
geoengineering. In particular, a marginal reduction in the level of mitigation by country 1
causes an increase in the level of geoengineering implemented by country 2. The strategic
effect is the weighted sum of two individual forces: a reduction in the marginal damages
from temperature, µδ1, and an increase in the marginal damages directly caused by geo-
engineering, [1− µ]ρ1. Thus, the relative importance of climate change damages relative to
geoengineering damages ultimately determines the magnitude of the strategic effect. With
some manipulation, it can be shown that [µδ1 − [1− µ]ρ1] = γ1 ∂g
1(M)
∂M
. Hence, we can define





. This strategic effect is additive and negative; thus,
it further reduces the marginal benefits of mitigation. With this new definitions, equation
(12) can be rewritten as:
α1m1 = µδ1[T0 −M ] + ζγ1[T0 −M ] (13)
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Lemma 1: When countries are similar, the technical substitution effect dominates the
strategic effect; that is µδ1 > ζγ1.
Proof: Proof is in the Appendix.
It follows directly from Lemma 1 that the marginal damages are reduced relative to the
scenario without geoengineering. Specifically, the slope of the marginal damages is reduced
from δ1 to µδ1 − γ1ζ. In equilibrium, this reduction in the slope of the marginal damages
causes a reduction in the marginal benefits of mitigation. This change in the marginal
benefits is common to the two countries (µ is not country specific); thus, both countries
implement a lower level of mitigation in equilibrium.
Proposition 2: The level of mitigation in the equilibrium with geoengineering is lower
than in the equilibrium without geoengineering.
Proof: Proof is in the Appendix.
The strategic reduction in the level of mitigation due to geoengineering is given by ζ.
This effect is one of the main reservations that scientists have on the promotion of geo-
engineering technologies. However, the presence of geoengineering also causes a reduction in
mitigation due to the technical substitution effect; which reduces the costs for both countries
in equilibrium. I have shown that, when the underlying characteristics of the two countries
are similar, the technical effect dominates the strategic effect; thus, the equilibrium level of
mitigation with geoengineering is a Pareto improvement over the equilibrium without it.
Nonetheless, an overall reduction in the costs of climate change do not necessarily rep-
resent a reduction in surface temperature. The next proposition shows that the tempera-
ture level with geoengineering is lower than without geoengineering if the strategic effect is
strongly dominated by the technical substitution effect.







< 1, then temperature with geoengineering is lower
than without geoengineering.
Proof: See the appendix
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Proposition 3 establishes the condition for which temperature is lower in the presence
of geoengineering. Temperature will decrease if an increase of one unit of geoengineering
creates a less than proportional reductio in terms of reduction in mitigation efforts. Starting
with the decision of one of the countries in isolation, the strategic effect is zero and it follows
from Proposition 1 that µ < 1 and temperature is always lower. When the second country
also introduces geoengineering, country 1 has an incentive to free-ride on country 2’s level
of geoengineering further reducing mitigation in country 1. If this increase in free-riding is
large enough it may cause an increase in temperature. Hence, for temperature to be lower
with geoengineering we need the strength of the strategic effect to be small. This is in turn
determined by how responsive are countries in terms of mitigation. In particular, if the
marginal costs of mitigation are large, αi is large, geoengineering is more likely to reduce
temperature.
To summarize, when the two countries are similar regarding damages from climate change
and from geoengineering, the technical substitution effect dominates the strategic effect. As
a result, there is a reduction in the levels of mitigation in both countries, but the total cost
of climate change is also lower. The results in this section depend on the assumption of
an interior equilibrium; that is, I am assuming the underlying parameters of the model are
similar across countries. In the next section I study the case where the two countries are
asymmetric; to the extent in which only one of them implements geoengineering.
4.2.2 Asymmetric countries
In this section I analyze the case where country 1 introduces geoengineering and country 2
does not.5 In this case
G∗(M) = g∗1(M) = ψ1[T0 −M ]
5Specifically I assume the conditions hold for the solution to be at the top and left corner in Figure 1.
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and the first order conditions for country 1, following from (11), are:
α1m1 = δ1[1− ψ1][T0 −M ] (14)
Equation (14) shows the slope of the marginal damages from temperature is reduced
by a fraction [1 − ψ1], relative to the case without geoengineering. This is equivalent to
the technical substitution effect described above. However — given that country 1 is the
only country implementing geoengineering — there is not strategic effect present in equation
(14). As a result, the marginal benefits of mitigation are reduced in country 1. This is not
necessarily true for country 2. The first order condition for country 2, following (11), is given
by:
α2m2 = δ2[1− ψ1][T0 −M ]− [[1− ψ1]δ2 − ρ2ψ1]
∂g1
∂M
[T0 −M ] (15)
I identify two effects in the previous equation: the technical substitution effect, now given
by [1− ψ1] and the strategic effect, now given by [[1− ψ1]δ2 − ρ2ψ1]∂g
1(M)
∂M
. Contrary to the
case of similar countries, the strategic effect is now positive. This implies that the two effects
are competing with each other to determine whether the marginal benefits of mitigation in
country 2 increase or decrease with geoengineering.
Lemma 2: In the unilateral equilibrium, the strategic effect dominates the technical







Proof: Proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 shows the condition needed for the strategic effect to dominate the technical
substitution effect. This condition says that the level of mitigation with geoengineering in
country 2 will increase if the damages from geoengineering are larger than the ratio between
country 1’s propensity to substitute mitigation for geoengineering (1−ψ1) and the technical
substitution effect (ψ1). If the propensity to substitute is large, then country 1 is more likely
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to substitute away from mitigation and increase geoengineering. If the technical substitution
effect is low, then geoengineering imposes more costs than it creates benefits. These two
situations lead to an increase in the level of mitigation by country 2.













, then mitigation in country 1 decreases and mitigation in country 2 increases
with geoengineering.
Proof: See the appendix
The intuition behind this result starts by recalling that country 2 does not implement
geoengineering because it is too costly in terms of damages. If country 1 introduces geo-
engineering, country 2 has an incentive to increase its level of mitigation and decrease the
marginal benefits of geoengineering in country 1. As a result, there are higher levels of
mitigation in country 2.
Figure 2 illustrates the results in Proposition 4. The left panel shows the results of the
first part of Proposition 4. If the technical substitution effect dominates the strategic effect,
then the slope of country 2’s best response function becomes flatter. Given the best response
function for country 1 is steeper, the resulting equilibrium levels of mitigation are lower in
both countries. The right panel in Figure 4 shows the opposite result. If the technical
substitution effect is dominated by the strategic effect, then the slope of the best response
function for country 2 becomes steeper, which results in higher levels of mitigation in country
2. In other words, Proposition 4.ii implies that, if the damages from geoengineering in
country 2 are high relative to the damages in country 1, then country 2 has a greater incentive
to increase its mitigation level in order to reduce the level of geoengineering chosen by country
1. In particular, in the limiting case where γ1 + ρ1 = 0, the condition in Proposition 4.ii
holds when ρ2 > δ2. That is, the marginal damages from geoengineering are larger than the
regional damage from climate change.
































SSm 1 ( )
2 1( )
G g Mm m=
1m*1NGm*1SSm
Figure 2: Mitigation stage equilibrium—Asymmetric countries. The horizontal axis repre-
sents the mitigation level in country 1, and the vertical axis represents the mitigation level
in country 2. The downward sloping solid lines represent the best response functions in
the absence of geoengineering for country 1 and 2 and they are denoted by mNG1 (m2) and
mNG2 (m1), respectively. The dashed lines represent the best response functions with geo-
engineering for country 1 and 2, which are denoted by m
G=g1(M)
1 (m2) and m
G=g1(M)
2 (m1),
respectively. The left panel shows the results of the first part in Proposition 4 and the right
panel shows the results the second part in Proposition 4.
inefficiently high levels of mitigation in the equilibrium with geoengineering. Two conditions
have to hold simultaneously: large asymmetries and orthogonal asymmetries in the damages
from geoengineering and climate change. Large asymmetries in the damages from climate
change have been documented previously in the literature. In particular, the IPCC’s Third
Assessment Report compares different studies and shows that if surface temperature increases
by 2.5oC, countries like Russia will gain 0.7% in their GDP, while regions of the world like
India or Africa will suffer damages on the order of 4% to 5% of GDP (IPCC, 2001). Recent
computer experiments on the effects of geoengineering schemes in the hydrological cycle
suggest damages from geoengineering could be highly asymmetric (Caldeira and Matthews,
2007 and Bala et. al. 2008). In a recent paper that uses numerical simulations to determine
the temperature and precipitation deviations from pre-industrial levels due to geoengineering,
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Kate Ricke and her co-authors show that while China will benefit from geoengineering, the
benefits for India are substantially lower (Ricke et.al. 2010). Hence, it is possible for China
and India to engage in the situation I described before in which India increases its level of
mitigation to reduce the incentives of China to introduce geoengineering.
It follows from the previous proposition that, for large asymmetries in the damages
from climate change and geoengineering, the cost to country 2 increases beyond the costs
associated with the first best levels of mitigation absent geoengineering. This suggest that
country 1 could attain a better outcome in a climate negotiation if it could credibly threaten
to engage in geoengineering. Country 2 now has a real incentive to commit to higher levels
of mitigation or else country 1 would resort to geoengineering strategies in the second stage,
making country 2 worse off.
To summarize, when countries are asymmetric two possibilities arise. First, if the asym-
metries from climate change and geoengineering are parallel — that is, if the relative winners
with climate change are winners with geoengineering — geoengineering further increases
costs in countries that were losers from climate change. In this case, mitigation levels are
inefficiently low. However, if the asymmetries from climate change and geoengineering are
orthogonal — that is, if the relative winners with climate change are losers with geoengineer-
ing — and if the costs of mitigation are not prohibitively high, it is possible to have more
mitigation when geoengineering is available. In this situation, countries that were originally
losers with climate change decrease their costs at the expense of an increase in the costs of
countries that are losers with geoengineering.
5 Conclusions
This paper has shown that geoengineering does not necessarily increase the free-riding effect
on mitigation. In fact, under asymmetry, it is possible that the prospect of geoengineering
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may induce inefficiently high levels of mitigation. This possibility should be considered when
discussing the international implications of introducing geoengineering.
This paper also suggests that strategic effects play a major role in determining the impact
of geoengineering on the analysis of climate change. In particular, the presence of geoengi-
neering may introduce new leverage that favors developing countries in future negotiations
on climate change.
The analysis was performed using a model that is purposely simple. I have done so to
concentrate on the strategic interaction between countries. Although some of my results
are contrary to standard results in the literature, the method I use is very familiar. In
fact, these results follow from seriously considering the differences between mitigation and
geoengineering, which lend themselves to the application of the same standard two-stage
equilibrium methods as those used in the analysis of capacity building (or R&D) and output.
At this moment it is difficult to conclude whether geoengineering technologies are essential
for dealing with climate change; however, the same lack of evidence makes it very difficult
to conclude that the best option is to preclude their use. A serious understanding of the
interaction between geoengineering and mitigation, both theoretically and empirically, is
necessary to be able to determine whether or not geoengineering is worth considering as a
tool to manage climate change. This paper is a step towards this understanding.
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Appendix
Proof Lemma 1: From equation (10), µ = γ1γ2+ρ1γ2+ρ2γ1
γ1γ2+γ1[δ2+ρ2]+γ2[δ1+ρ1]
, and from the definition










Lemma 1 we need the sign of µδ1 − ζγ1; replacing definitions we have:
µδ1 − ζγ1 = δ1[γ1γ2+ρ1γ2+ρ2γ1][γ1γ2+γ1[δ2+ρ2]+γ2[δ1+ρ1]][γ1γ2+γ1[δ2+ρ2]+γ2[δ1+ρ1]]2 −
γ1[δ1γ2+δ1ρ2−ρ1δ2][δ2γ1+δ2ρ1−ρ2δ1]
[γ1γ2+γ1[δ2+ρ2]+γ2[δ1+ρ1]]2














Proof Proposition 2: Lemma 1 implies that the marginal damages from climate change
are reduced in country 1, which implies there is a lower incentive to implement mitigation.
This is true for the two countries, which translates on a steeper slope of the reaction functions
(a greater incentive to free ride). Hence, there is less mitigation in equilibrium. See Figure
3 for an illustration of this proof. QED
Proof Proposition 3: In the interior equilibrium the total level of geoengineering is given by




















Now, it is straight forward to show that T > TNG if and only if ζ > α1α2
γ1α2+γ2α1
[1− µ]. QED
Proof Lemma 2: The strategic effect is dominated by the technical substitution effect when
the slope of the marginal damages with geoengineering is lower than without geoengineering,
that is: δ2 >
δ2[ρ1+γ1]2+ρ2δ21
[γ1+ρ1+δ1]2
, which implies ρ2 < 2
δ2
δ1
[γ1 + ρ1] + δ2. QED
Proof Proposition 4: Given Lemma 2, marginal damages from climate change in country 2
are reduced, which results in a greater incentive to reduce its level of mitigation. Country 1’s
marginal damages are always lower in the presence of geoengineering; hence, both countries
implement lower levels of mitigation in the presence of geoengineering. If the condition in
Lemma 2 is violated; that is, if ρ2 > 2
δ2
δ1
[γ1 + ρ1] + δ2, then country 2 has an incentive to
26
increase its level of mitigation because the marginal damages from climate change are larger
when geoengineering is available. Thus, in equilibrium, country 2 implements higher levels
of mitigation with geoengineering than without. Country 1 implements even lower levels of
mitigation. QED
Proof Proposition 5: The slope of the marginal damages in the first best without geo-
engineering is equal to δ1 +δ2. Geoengineering causes and increase in the levels of mitigation
beyond the first best levels if δ1+δ2 <
δ2[ρ1+γ1]2+ρ2δ21
[γ1+ρ1+δ1]2
, which implies ρ2 >
δ2
δ1
[δ1 + 2[γ1 + ρ1]]+
[γ1+ρ1+δ1]2
δ1
. QED
27
